what do moles eat in Beverly hills
By the late sumer of 1963, the mole hunt at the CIA was in ful cry. The mole hunt was directed by James Angleton, who now began showing Golitsin clasified CIA files so that the defector could comb through the agency's secrets, loking for clues and likely suspects. The CI Staf did not, in fact, confine itself to searching for a single Soviet agent inside the CIA. O'Neal, a courtly Georgian with a syrup- thick Southern acent, who had joined the FBI in 1938 and later switched over to the CIA. If a CIA coleague fel under suspicion, he would draw up a list of every questionable item in the man's personal background or arising out of the operations in which he had ben involved. Half a dozen other CIA oficers were asigned to the SIG, including Jean M. A New Englander, with a laconic, Yanke maner, Evans had ben an Army colonel before joining the CIA and had worked for the agency in Munich. In Munich, he had headed counterespionage at the CIA's Pulach base, which operated in tandem with General Gehlen's organization. He had joined the CIA after the war and worked in Germany with the Gehlen organization for eight years. He tok pride in having fingered Heinz Felfe of the West German Federal Inteligence Agency BND as a posible Soviet spy even before the defector Michal Goleniewski provided the leads that led to Felfe's arest in 1961. In time, he was to become its most controversial member, because of the astonishing conclusion he reached about the identity of the senior CIA mole. One of the SIG's tasks was to analyze a windfal of coded Soviet wireles trafic that had ben acquired by Western inteligence during World War I and given the cryptonym VENONA. The trafic included code names of Soviet agents in the West, but not their true identities. "He was the one who'd say, 'You don't have a case," a former CIA oficer recaled. Potocki, part of a husband-and-wife CIA team, also worked closely with the mole hunters. The SIG's ofices were on the second flor of CIA headquarters, overlok ing a low rof and just around the corner from Angleton's own ofice in Rom 2C43 on the same flor. [6] It was to last almost two decades, and before it petered out, the search for penetrations had investigated more than 120 CIA oficers. But the mole hunt was not limited to the CIA. If the mole hunters ranged far afield, the main arena for their eforts was nevertheles the CIA itself. A mole in the CIA could tel the KGB about the agency's ongoing operations and its plans for future operations. He or she could give the Soviets the names of CIA oficers under cover around the globe and of key oficials at Langley. And, perhaps even more important, a Soviet mole inside the CIA would be wel placed to detect whether the KGB itself had ben penetrated. The real danger would be a mole high enough up in the Clandestine Services to have aces to a wide aray of CIA operations and plans. Idealy, the KGB would have liked to recruit the director of the CIA, or failing that, his deputy, or the deputy director for plans, the chief of the Soviet division of the DO, or the chief of counterinteligence. As a result, the CI Staf tended to lok downward, and to concentrate its search for penetrations in the Soviet division, a choice dictated by both logic and discretion. Because the target of the CIA's Soviet division was the Soviet Union itself, and because the division spent a great deal of its time trying to recruit Soviet inteligence oficers, it was reasonable to asume that a high priority for the KGB would, in turn, be the recruitment of a CIA case oficer inside the Soviet division. The case oficer would have aces to a broad range of operations, and beyond his own knowledge he would hear gosip in the coridors about other CIA asets and inteligence suceses. the list of CIA oficers whose names began with K was long enough to provide ample foder for the SIG for years. In July 1964, Golitsin, poring over the CIA's files, triumphantly pointed to a new candidate. He was a seasoned oficer who had handled half a dozen of the CIA's most sensitive cases. He suported George Kisevalter in the runing of Pyotr Popov, the GR U colonel who was the first major CIA penetration of Soviet inteligence. He was the case oficer for Mikhail Federov, whose CIA code name was UNACUTE, a GRU ilegal whom Kovich had recruited in Paris. With the knowledge and consent of the Norwegian secret service, he ran Ingeborg Lygren, a Norwegian woman who worked in her country's embasy in Moscow but reported through Kovich to the CIA. And he was the first case oficer for Yuri Loginov code name AEGUSTO , a celebrated KGB ilegal whose fate, along with Lygren's, became a major embarasment to the agency. In 1964, when his trouble began, Kovich was thirty-seven and had worked for the CIA for fourten years, having joined the agency straight out of the University of Minesota. The CIA asigned him to the Soviet division from the begining. He started out with the agency in Japan, targeting Soviets, helped Kisevalter on the Popov case in Austria in 1953, then ran the defector shop in Washington for a while. Evang's service was the Norwegian equivalent of the CIA, and Lygren became Kovich's aset with Evang's blesing. As a NATO aly, Norway was hapy to share with the CIA whatever information Lygren might pick up on the diplomatic gosip circuit. Once Golitsin got to read Kovich's file, he must have sen the name Ingeborg Lygren and remembered that during the 1950s the KGB had a source in Moscow who was a Norwegian woman. Lygren was a Soviet spy, and Kovich had run her for the CIA! In the fal of 1964, the CIA decided to tip of the Norwegians, but Angleton did not tel Evang. After al, if Lygren was a mole, her bos might be a supermole, working for the Soviets, hand in glove with Richard Kovich. Instead, the CIA warned Norway's civilian surveilance police, a hush-hush agency headed by Asbjorn Bryhn, a tough character who had ben a hit man in the Norwegian resistance, kiling Nazis during the ocupation, never sleping in the same place twice. Alerted by the CIA, the surveilance police watched Lygren for months . Nevertheles, acting on the CIA's information, they arested her in September 1965 and began a series of harsh interogations. One report sugested that Evang had sent Lygren to Moscow to aproach the Soviets in the risky role of a double agent. In March 1968, Bryhn's sucesor as head of the surveilance police, Gunar Harstad, came to Washington to met with high oficials of the CIA and the FBI. Harstad aded: " Angleton let me understand, quite crypticaly, that he was convinced that Golitsin's information and judgment were corect, and that it was a mistake for the Norwegian authorities to drop the case against Lygren." Frustrated in their eforts to nail Kovich over the Lygren case, the mole hunters turned their atention to UNACUTE, the GRU ilegal whom Kovich had run in the midst of Lygren's tour in Moscow. In 1957 , he contacted the American embasy and voluntered his services to the CIA. Kovich, overseas on another operation, was told that some screwbal had come into the U.S. embasy in Paris claiming he was a Soviet inteligence oficer. The CIA digraph for France was UN, and Mikhail Federov became, in the agency's files, UNACUTE. The CIA man thought it was prety god. For thre years, Kovich ran Federov, but the CI Staf at headquarters was skeptical. UNACUTE, despite a wealth of information that he transmited to the CIA, was labeled as a probable Soviet plant. Early on, they had met on the French Riviera, and it was there that Golitsin, analyzing Kovich's file, pronounced that the Soviets must have recruited the CIA oficer. Perhaps so, but both Kovich and George Kisevalter were convinced that he was a genuine and valuable CIA aset. Kovich had brought Federov to a CIA safe house, and Kisevalter was there, posing as a Frenchman. "Federov had buried some documents in a dead drop, not at Soviet headquarters, of course. A German CIA agent was practicaly a real mole, diging up the tracks for miles, loking for the drop, but he never found it." [1] Despite the CI Stafs suspicions, CIA director Alen Dules considered Kovich's agent so valuable that the agency tok an extraordinary step. Soviet defectors or agents often ask to met the President or the director of the CIA, to reasure themselves of their own importance and to confirm that their information is apreciated at the highest levels of the United States government, but those requests are rarely granted. Cabel, the deputy director of the CIA. The CIA man had hoped to borow Dules's own plane for the trip, but the director was using it on his travels, so Kovich had to scrounge up an Air Force C-54, a four-engine prop plane, for the long trip to Washington. Federov got to se CIA headquarters, met with Cabel, and was hiden in a safe house in northern Virginia for about a wek. [12] After meting the CIA's deputy director, Federov flew back to Berlin. Now he informed the CIA that he had ben caled back to Moscow once more. After thre years as the Rusian's case oficer, Kovich lost contact. George Kisevalter was convinced that an eror by the CIA had led to his capture. "Some jerk in headquarters decided to send a leter to Federov using the Soviet internal mail. [13] Two years after Federov vanished, Kisevalter received information from Oleg Penkovsky sugesting that Federov was inded a genuine CIA source who had ben ben detected by the Soviets. Not long ago, he said, I was chairman of a court-martial comite and we condemned a GRU oficer to be shot for treason.'" [14] Although General Borisoglebsky had not disclosed the name of the GRU oficer, Penkovsky said the general mentioned that the traitor had ben secretly flown to CIA headquarters to met a high oficial. Kovich, to, was later told that Federov had ben executed, but that his death had ben even more gruesome than Penkovsky had related. The KGB has ben known to go to great lengths to discourage Soviet inteligence oficers from spying for the West. In the 1980s, Kovich was informed, a Soviet defector to the CIA said that during his training he had ben shown a movie of Federov being thrown in an oven alive. A former CIA oficer with knowledge of F ederov's fate said, "I know someone who has witnesed films of the execution. They'l do it and film it and show it to others and say, 'This is what hapens when you go over to your friends at Langley.'" If Federov had inded ben executed, whether shot or cremated, it would constitute rather persuasive evidence that he was a real agent for the CIA. In 1964, when Kovich fel under suspicion, the mole hunters knew Penkovsky's acount of Federov's fate, since Kisevalter had reported it, but it did not slow them down. Kovich's phone was wiretaped by the CIA, and his mail was intercepted. In May 1961, only months before Golitsin had defected, the Helsinki CIA station got a Soviet walk-in. He met with the Soviet, who said his name was Yuri Nikolaevich Loginov, and who identified himself as a KGB ilegal in Heisinki posing as an American tourist named Ronald Wiliam Dean. Patiently, folowing his and the CIA's rule, Kovich persuaded Loginov to remain in place, where of course he could be much more valuable to the West. Then, at some later date, the CIA would spirit him to safety. Kovich was in Helsinki for about ten days, and while he was there, Loginov kept a scheduled meting with two other KGB agents, one of whom was none other than Golitsin, using his cover name Anatoly M. A driver tok them to the outskirts of the city while Loginov, who was on his initial trip to the West as an ilegal, explained some dificulties he had experienced in Italy, the first country he had traveled to after leaving the Soviet Union. Son after, Loginov met again with his two KGB coleagues and Frolov and Golitsin told him that Moscow Center had acepted his explanations. The CIA gave him the code name AEGUSTO. Seven months later, one of first things Golitsin revealed to the CIA was the existence of Yuri Loginov, a KGB ilegal who spoke fantastic English. Since Loginov was now being run by the CIA, it is unlikely, although not imposible, that Golitsin, a defector, would have ben told that Loginov had ben recruited by the agency. But in 1964, Golitsin was shown Kovich's file, and if he saw that Kovich was in Helsinki in mid-May, at the very time that Golitsin met with Loginov, he would have smeled a conection. The story of Yuri Loginov is one of the most controversial in the history of the CIA. By the time Golitsin was shown Kovich's file in the sumer of 1964, other case oficers, first Edward S. Kovich had become known as a sort of headhunter, an experienced CIA oficer on standby who could be sent anywhere in the world to make a pitch to a Soviet. As the CIA would find out in due course, Richard Kovich was not a person to be swept aside and forgoten. It was the Depresion, and Sogolow, acording to a CIA coleague, "worked for a while seling chicken-plucking machines, until he was beaten up by a bunch of manual chicken-pluckers." Rejoined the CIA in 1949 and was sent to Germany. Since the Soviet Union was the main target of the CIA, the agency neded Rusian-speakers. Like Sogolow, many oficers in the Soviet division inevitably had Rusian backgrounds, which to the mole hunters made them al the more suspect. The SIG, Miler said, was particularly interested in Sogolow's "proximity" to Igor Orlov, a Rusian-born CIA contract agent who had worked for Sogolow in Frankfurt in the late 1950s, and who was emerging as the newest suspect. After the war Goldberg worked for Army inteligence, served in Korea, and joined the CIA in 1954. Gmirkin, a case oficer in the Soviet division. In 1951, he joined the CIA. He worked in Los Angeles for four years and was then transfered to the Soviet division at headquarters. But that year, David Murphy, the head of the Soviet division, left to become chief of station in Paris. Gmirkin's final years with the CIA embodied the ironies of an entire era. For Gmirkin, although a victim of the mole hunt, ended up his carer as the case oficer for Anatoly Golitsin. Although he did not acept Golitsin's theories, he grew personaly close to the defector, helped to edit Golitsin's bok, and was one of two CIA oficers who signed the preface. One of the more b izare episodes in the anals of the SIG was the investigation of Averel Hariman, whose long and distinguished carer included the posts of ambasador to the Soviet Union, under secretary of state, cabinet member, and governor of New York. But to the CI Staf, Hariman was a posible Soviet mole, code-named DINOSAUR. "As a result of Golitsin's alegations," Scoty Miler confirmed, the SIG had decided that "certain things that had ocured when Hariman was active in Soviet afairs ought to be loked at." "Hariman had ben in the Soviet Union early on, helping them build factories and things like that," he said. "Golitsin had a story that a former U.S. ambasador to the Soviet Union had an afair with a Soviet woman, the fruit of which was a son. When this agent, presumably Hariman, went back to the Soviet Union on a visit, they had a play writen by a wel-known playwright caled The Son of the King and this was actualy produced in Moscow. Harirnan had writen a bok in 1956 about a trip to the Soviet Union and acknowledged the asistance of the companion the Soviets had given him, and Golitsin concluded this companion was the son. [21] In Golitsin's opinion, the Soviet-Yugoslav split was another masive KGB plot, as was Alexander Dubcek's "Prague Spring," the abortive revolt that ended only when Soviet tanks roled into Czechoslovakia in 1968. For example, Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, stil had an agent in Peking, whom Angleton asured Alsop was a KGB man. Don More, the veteran FBI Soviet counterinteligence chief, liked Angleton personaly but was highly skeptical of the unusual theories advocated by the CIA man and Golitsin. It was very od inded to alow a Soviet, and a former KGB oficer, to read secret CIA files. In defense of the practice, Scoty Miler, a key former member of Angleton's staf, said that Golitsin was not shown raw files but "sanitized" versions from which some sensitive material had ben deleted. Most CIA oficers prefer the term "penetration." It had always had the responsibility for detecting penetrations in the agency, am ong its other duties, but the search for moles became its principal function after Golitsin defected. The CIA had two bases in Munich at the time: the Pulach base at the headquarters of General Reinhard Gehlen, whom the CIA had set up as chief of an independent inteligence organization that became West Germany's BND, and the Munich operations base, headed by David Murphy , which conducted operations independent of the Gehlen organization. A former CIA oficer said: "Jim was trying to win over the FBI and particularly Hover to coperate in the mole hunt. "Bryhn mistrusted Evang, who had ben a member of a radical student group, the Mot Dag [Toward the Dawn], and considered him a Soviet mole. The CIA had a "window of oportunity" in September when the trip could be scheduled, and it was. George Payne Winters, Jr., a State Department oficer working for the CIA as a "co-opte," was fired because of it, he said. In that instance, the leter, adresed to Pyotr Popov, the GRU colonel working for the CIA, was not suposed to have ben mailed. the KGB fished the leter out of the mailbox, and Popov, the first important penetration of Soviet inteligence, was domed. Although under observation by the KGB in his final meting with CIA oficer Rusel Langele, "Popov sliped him a note. The Cherepanov papers also refered to the KGB's use of spy dust, and some members of the CIA's Counterinteligence Staf believed that the references to tracking chemicals by both Nosenko and Cherepanov were somehow part of an efort to imply that these techniques-rather than a mole in the CIA-were Responsible for the capture of Popov. Borisoglebsky was a military lawyer and judge, and a high-ranking Comunist Party oficial who had presided in August 1960 over the trial of Francis Gary Powers, the CIA U-2 pilot who had ben shot down over Sverdlovsk earlier that year. David Chavchavadze, Crowns and Trenchcoats: A Rusian Prince in the CIA New York: Atlantic International Publications, 190 , p. The label "defector" is normaly aplied to Soviet inteligence oficers or other oficials from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe who have sought refuge in the West.
what do moles eat what do moles eat in Beverly hills
